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Visual Literacy vs. Visual Manipulation 
PAUL MESSARIS 
 
The concept of visual literacy appears to have originated in the notion that 
visual communication depends on shared conventions which may be likened 
productively to the syntactic and semantic conventions of spoken and written 
language. Systematic treatments of this notion occur at least as early as the 1950s 
in analytical writing about motion pictures, such as Raymond Spottiswoode's 
Grammar of the Film (1950). As this title suggests, Spottiswoode's version of the 
analogy between visual communication and language was expressed in the 
formulation of "grammatical" rules, thought to account for the ways in which 
meaning is created through visual composition and editing.  
The attempt to explicate rules or regularities of this sort remains a concern in 
film scholarship (for example, Bordwell et al., 1985; Carroll, 1980; Metz, 1974), as 
well as work on other visual media (for example, Dondis, 1973; Saint-Martin, 
1990; Prince, 1990; Zettl, 1990). The term visual "literacy" appears in writing on 
this topic as a comprehensive label for the cognitive skills involved in the fluent 
use of these visual "grammars." In an influential early definition, Debes describes 
visual literacy as follows: "a group of vision competencies [that] enable a visually 
literate person to discriminate and interpret . . . visible actions, objects, and/ or 
symbols .... Through the creative use of these competencies, [a person] is able to 
communicate with others. Through the creative use of these competencies [the 
person] is able to comprehend and enjoy the masterworks of visual 
communication" (Debes, 1970, p. 1).  
As Debes's statement makes clear, scholarly writing about visual literacy 
initially emphasized its cognitive and aesthetic implications. This emphasis is 
characteristic of much subsequent scholarship (for example, Braden et al., 1993; 
Curtiss, 1987; Foss and Kanengieter, 1991; Metallinos, 1992). At the same time, 
however, the scope of visual-literacy studies has been broadened to include an 
additional, relatively distinct issue, namely, the possibility that visual literacy may 
be a means of counteracting the influence of visual media on their viewers. More 
specifically, it has been argued that an understanding of how visual communication 
works--how visual conventions are used to create meaning and to elicit responses 
from viewers-may make a person better able to resist the power of television and 
other visual media (see Brown, 1991; Kubey & Ruben, in press; Lewis, 1992; see 
also Gomery, 1993, p. 45, for a discussion of visual literacy as an alternative to 
media censorship). In short, this formulation sees visual literacy as a means of 
defense against visual manipulation. It is this view that will be the focus of the 
following discussion.  
The elements of this defensive aspect of visual literacy vary somewhat, 
depending on which particular type of visual manipulation is at issue. In the case of 
advertising and other persuasive uses of visual media, one set of studies has sought 
to specify the nature of the manipulative devices that might be known by visually 
literate viewers. Related research has examined the extent to which various 
categories of viewers are aware of the devices in question. However, a different 
line of argument has focused on advertising techniques that purportedly elude 
conscious perception-and may therefore be impervious to "literate" viewing.  
An emphasis on covert (and, by implication, potentially undetectable) 
practices has also been characteristic of much recent writing on the ostensibly 
informational uses of visual media. Of particular concern have been two forms of 
visual fabrication: first, the computer-assisted alteration of photographs; second, 
the staging of photographic images that are subsequently presented as authentic 
documents. In both cases, discussion has centered on how awareness of the 
possibility of fabrication might affect viewers' beliefs about the relationship 
between photography and reality. Similar questions have been raised about another 
feature of the visual media's documentation of reality, namely, its inevitable 
selectivity.  
The kinds of concerns described thus far-issues of visual persuasion and 
visual misinformation-have also played a part in scholarship dealing with the 
broader social consequences and ideological implications of visual communication. 
However, because much of this scholarship has focused on fictional genres, it has 
investigated an additional topic that may be less relevant to the study of advertising 
or news, that is, the illusion of reality that certain forms of visual fiction seek to 
cultivate in their viewers. Operating on the assumption that this illusion encourages 
an unquestioning acceptance of a film or TV program's ideological premises, some 
researchers have investigated how viewers respond to the visual devices on which 
the illusion is thought to depend.  
The following discussion examines visual literacy in reference to each of the 
areas of concern outlined above: visual persuasion, visual misinformation, and the 
illusion of reality in visual fiction. However, the discussion is also motivated by a 
question cutting across all three areas: What are the social consequences of the 
ways in which scholars, journalists, and other commentators have framed public 
discussions of visual manipulation and visual literacy? This question will be 
addressed most directly in the discussion’s concluding section.  
 
Visual Persuasion 
Positioning the viewer 
 
A standard illustration of the idea that visual conventions are like a language 
is the familiar compositional device of varying the angle of view in order to affect 
viewers' perceptions of the power of a person in an image. According to this 
traditional usage, low angles of view, which create the effect of looking up at 
someone, enhance the image's implications of power, while high angles do the 
opposite. This relationship between form and meaning is one of the most regular 
and stable conventions of visual communication (although it is, of course, 
inevitably dependent on context; cf. Bordwell and Thompson, l986). It is 
presumably such characteristics that have led writers to describe this and other 
conventions as constituting a visual language or grammar.  
Pursuing the comparison with language further, Dyer has argued that a 
viewer’s ability to make sense of this device must result from prior exposure, from 
the fact that "we have learned the codes and conventions of television and film 
practice" (Dyer, 1989, p. 131). But here the linguistic metaphor has probably been 
stretched too far. In the case of language, prior learning is a prerequisite of 
interpretation because the connections between sound and meaning are arbitrary. 
However, the angle-of-view convention is a relatively clear instance of a non-
arbitrary, analog relationship between form and meaning. It derives its significance 
by replicating the form (and, hence, some of the implications) of a real-world 
visual experience (looking up at someone vs. looking down at her/him). This 
analog quality suggests that a viewer's ability to understand the angle-of-view 
convention may be less dependent on prior learning than is linguistic 
comprehension. Precisely for this reason, however, it could be argued that this 
convention is a particularly good example of the need for the defensive kind of 
visual literacy that is the focus of this discussion. The more transparent a 
convention is, the less viewers may be aware of it. For example, a verbal slogan 
proclaiming a politician "a strong leader" may be a more obvious persuasive 
device-- to some people--than a campaign picture showing her/him from a low 
angle.  
Viewers' awareness of angle of view in a political context was explored by 
Mandell and Shaw (1973), in an early experimental study of this convention. 
College students attending introductory classes in a department of radio, television, 
and film were asked to make judgments about a political figure appearing in a 
newscast. There were three versions of this person's image: one taken at eye level, 
the others at angles of twelve degrees below or above his eyes. The students' 
ratings of how powerful the person looked varied according to which of the three 
versions they were shown. As expected, lower angles led to higher ratings. It 
turned out, though, that most of the students did not seem conscious of the 
influence of angle of view. At the conclusion of the study, they were asked directly 
to comment about camera angles used in the newscast. Out of a total of 78 students 
who saw either the high- or the low-angle versions, only thirteen showed some 
awareness of this device in their responses (Mandell and Shaw, 1973, p. 362).  
What makes this finding especially interesting is that these students, all 
enrolled in media courses, can presumably be regarded as relatively "literate" 
viewers, compared to the broader public. This feature of the study gives added 
force to its implications regarding the unobtrusiveness of visual conventions. On 
the other hand, it is conceivable that some of the students did notice the high or 
low angle but did not consider it worthy of comment. It is also conceivable that, 
despite their interest in media studies, some noticed the angle but could not express 
their awareness because of a lack of familiarity with technical terminology. In 
research of this sort, the latter possibility poses a recurring methodological 
obstacle.  
The angle-of-view convention can be considered part of a larger family of 
visual devices having to do with how the viewer is positioned relative to the people 
or objects in an image. (See Meyrowitz, 1986, for a general theoretical treatment of 
this area of visual communication.) A prominent member of this family of devices 
is the subjective shot, which simulates the point of view of one of the characters in 
a movie, TV program, or commercial. This kind of shot positions the viewer 
"inside" the action on the screen, and has traditionally been considered a means of 
eliciting identification with the character through whose eyes the action is shown.  
The use of subjective camera was studied by Galan (1986), who showed 
viewers three versions of a commercial in which two characters discuss the merits 
of a new (fictitious) product. One version presents the action through the eyes of a 
person praising the product. The second version gives the point of view of the 
person listening to these comments. In the third version, the action is presented 
without any subjective shots. As Galan expected, the two subjective versions were 
received more favorably than the third version. For present purposes, the more 
notable finding of this study had to do with the viewers' understanding of the visual 
variable being manipulated. Each viewer initially saw only one of the three 
versions of the commercial. After responding in detail to that one version, viewers 
were shown the other two and asked to describe the differences among them. 
Although the viewers were all marketing students and probably more 
knowledgeable about advertising than most people, only a minority referred 
explicitly to the fact that the two subjective versions were meant as representations 
of someone's point of view.  
As testimony about educated people's lack of visual literacy, this finding 
could be considered even more revealing than that of Mandell and Shaw, since 
Galan's viewers could compare different applications of the variable they were 
being asked about (although, unlike Mandell and Shaw's viewers, they were not 
given any indication of what kind of device to look for). As with Mandell and 
Shaw, however, Galan's procedure for investigating awareness raises obvious 
methodological questions that make it difficult to take the results entirely at face 
value. Moreover, as will be seen presently, similar problems of method have also 
bedeviled other attempts to study viewers' understanding of the persuasive uses of 
visual conventions.  
  
Associational Juxtaposition of Images 
 
Although the studies examined above provide a suggestive first view of the 
scope and some limitations of empirical research on visual literacy, the 
conventions examined in those studies usually play a subsidiary role as persuasive 
devices. The primary role in the visual organization of much political advertising 
and most commercial advertising is played by the device of associational 
juxtaposition. As Craig has pointed out in an examination of the origins of 
contemporary advertising practices, the use of visual imagery in commercial 
advertising has traditionally been guided by assumptions borrowed from 
behaviorist psychology (Craig, 1992, pp. 166-170). In particular, it has been 
assumed that attitudes toward a product can be shaped by juxtaposing its picture 
with other images. This "Pavlovian" notion of the transfer of meaning through 
association has been embraced openly in the advertising literature (see Stout, 
1984).  
Empirical support for this notion has come from a variety of sources. The 
general proposition that a viewer's responses to an object can be conditioned 
through visual association has been confirmed most memorably in a pair of 
experiments (Rachman, 1966; Rachman and Hodgson, 1968) in which 
associational juxtaposition was used to turn viewer into boot fetishists. As far as 
the specific area of advertising is concerned, what is commonly considered the 
definitive demonstration of the efficacy of associational juxtaposition was provided 
by Mitchell, in two related studies (Mitchell, 1986; Mitchell and Olson, 1981). In 
these studies, pictures of products were paired with a variety of images; as 
expected, viewers' ratings of the products corresponded to the particular pairing 
that they were shown. Correspondences of this sort have also been obtained in a 
non-laboratory situation by Zuckerman (1990), who compared one group of 
viewers' judgments about real products with a matched group's judgments about 
the associational imagery used in exiling advertising for those products.  
Viewers' awareness of associational juxtaposition was examined by Messaris 
and Nielsen (1989). This study dealt with the use of visual association as an editing 
strategy in TV advertising. As Prince (1990) has pointed out, television advertisers 
have resurrected an editing device that was relatively common in early Soviet 
cinema, as well as other films of the 1920s and 1930s, but has since all but 
disappeared from the fictional screen. The device in question consists of cutting 
back and forth between the principal subject of a scene and omit other image: for 
example, in Eisenstein's Strike (1925), cross-cutting between a massacre' of 
striking workers and the butchering of animals in a slaughterhouse. In its rebirth as 
a TV advertising convention. This cross-cutting strategy has been employed for 
associational purposes both in commercials and in political ads.  
Messaris and Nielsen's study was based on two examples of associational 
crosscutting. The first example was the opening scene of a political campaign 
video, "A New Beginning," used in the promotion of Ronald Reagan's re-election 
in 1984. In the extract used in the study, Ronald Reagan's first-term inauguration is 
intercut with early-morning images of people going to work. As Morreale noted in 
a detailed analysis of this scene, the cross-cutting expresses the video's overall 
theme, namely, that Reagan's first term in office was a time of economic and 
spiritual renewal (Morreale, 1991, pp. 71-75). The second example of associational 
juxtaposition used in the study was a commercial for a popular brand of fruit 
preserves, in which pictures of the product are intercut with images of rural life, 
suggesting wholesomeness and traditional values.  
In an attempt to assess the perceptions of people with different levels of 
education and visual literacy, the study included three groups of viewers: people 
without a college education; people with a college education; people employed 
professionally in TV production. Each viewer was shown one of the two examples 
of cross-cutting and asked to describe what she/he thought the intention of the 
sequence was. The primary question guiding the analysis of the responses was 
whether a viewer made any reference to an intended conceptual connection 
between the candidate or product and the intercut imagery (for example, "It's an 
attempt to relate Ronald Reagan with down-home American values"). Such 
references appeared as follows: among the viewers without college education, 22 
percent in the case of the Reagan campaign video and 50 percent in the case of the 
fruit-preserve commercial; among the college-educated viewers, 59 percent in the 
case of the Reagan video and 100 percent in the case of the commercial; and, 
among the TV professionals, 87 percent in the case of the Reagan video and 100 
percent in the case of the commercial.  
Once again, the use of a verbal method of assessing viewers' perceptions 
makes it difficult to be entirely confident about these findings. One cannot discount 
the possibility that the relatively low frequencies recorded among the less-educated 
viewers are due at least partly to a lack of a suitable vocabulary, rather than 
absence of awareness of the associational aspects of the editing. Even some of the 
more-educated viewers may have been hampered by unfamiliarity with technical 
terms. In view of these reasons for skepticism, perhaps the most prudent approach 
to these findings would be to treat them as indicators of issues that could be 
explored further through more suitable (less verbal) methods. Nonetheless, it is 
worth asking what the implications of the findings would be if they were taken at 
face value.  
All the evidence reviewed so far could be seen as supporting the position of 
educators and others who have argued for more public attention to problems of 
visual literacy. However, in certain respects this appearance of congruence may be 
misleading. Arguments about the need for visual literacy are often predicated on 
the claim that the visual devices used in advertising and other forms of potential 
manipulation evade awareness because of their complexity and deviousness. (Such 
arguments will be considered further below.) But it is important to emphasize that 
the devices examined in all three studies discussed here are in fact among the most 
rudimentary of visual conventions. In other words, rather than demonstrating any 
great subtlety in the visual means available to advertisers and propagandists, these 
studies actually suggest that many viewers may overlook even relatively obvious 
visual tactics. This point should be kept in mind in the following section of this 
discussion, in which the focus shifts to arguments about subterfuge in visual 
persuasion. 
 
Covert Persuasion  
 
Since the publication of Vance Packard's The Hidden Persuaders (1957), 
public discourse about advertising has frequently been framed as a defensive 
reaction against sophisticated, scientifically-informed techniques deliberately 
designed to avoid detection. This model of visual persuasion is especially likely to 
be encountered in mass-market publications, but it is by no means absent from the 
more scholarly literature on advertising practices. A recurring focus of arguments 
driven by this model is the issue of subliminal persuasion. Indeed, this kind of 
device is probably the canonical example of public conceptions about visual 
subterfuge.  
Concern about subliminal advertising first surfaced into public awareness in 
1957, when a market researcher's speculations about the effectiveness of brief, 
unconsciously-perceived messages, surreptitiously embedded in movies, were 
mistakenly reported as facts. Since then, the topic has been popularized in a series 
of publications by Wilson Bryan Key (1973, 1976, 1981, 1989). Key's descriptions 
of techniques of subliminal persuasion have tended to deal with print media more 
than with film or television. For example, in the introductory chapter of his most 
recent book he invites the reader to scrutinize an ad for Tanqueray gin that 
reportedly appeared in Time magazine and other national periodicals. The ad 
portrays a stream of gin flowing into a glass. According to Key, if one isolates a 
certain section of this design, one notices that a "formidable, erect, male genital has 
been embedded into the gin stream" (Key, 1989, p. 15). Similarly, he makes the 
following observation about the icing in an ad for Betty Crocker Super Moist cake 
mix: “Any standard anatomy text will confirm that the shape painted into the icing 
is an accurate tumescent female genital. 'Super Moist,' at the portrayed state of 
excitation, constitutes a normal physiological event” (p. 17).  
Specific interpretations of this sort are perhaps best considered matters of 
individual judgment. There may also be toward the general premise from which 
such techniques presumably stem, viz., the idea that elements of a visual design 
can evoke acontextual interpretations to which viewers respond without being 
aware of them. The assumption that an image's graphic shapes are meaningful in 
themselves is of course a commonly- accepted tenet in psychologically oriented 
theories of art (for example, Arnheim, 1988; Bang. 1991), and this assumption has 
been supported by applied research in graphic design (Espy. 1983). There is also 
empirical support for assuming that certain abstract shapes are commonly-perhaps 
even cross-culturally- perceived as connoting femininity or masculinity (for 
example, see Fischer, 1961), and research on stylistic features of television 
commercials has shown that such abstract features as editing rhythm are capable of 
connoting gender to children (Huston et al., 1984; Welch et al., 1979).  
In certain respects, then, beliefs in the efficacy of subliminal persuasion can 
be said to rest on foundations that are not particularly controversial. On the other 
hand, at least one element in these beliefs clearly goes beyond these more 
traditional conceptions of viewers' responses to visual media. In the research cited 
above, the graphic or other formal features that were tested were, in all cases, 
openly available for the viewer's inspection- even if some viewers were not 
consciously aware of them; in subliminal advertising, on the other hand, embedded 
objects or words are typically camouflaged or presented only very faintly. In order 
to work, therefore, a subliminal ad of this sort would have to elicit not only 
unconscious perception but also unconscious decipherment of a visual puzzle. This 
aspect of visual persuasion has been tested in a number of studies, and the results 
were generally negative (see Pratkanis and Aronson, 1992, for a review).  
Still, even if one were to accept fully the possibility that subliminal 
persuasion does work, another aspect of the matter may ultimately have more 
import for understanding social perspectives on visual manipulation and visual 
literacy. Subliminal advertising has been expressly condemned by more than one 
government agency, and except for occasional examples offered by Key and other 
writers, there is no evidence that it is even a marginal practice among mainstream 
advertisers. Under the circumstances, the continuing public receptivity to authors 
such as Key (all of whose books are still in circulation) must be seen as something 
other than a reasoned response to actual experiences of deception. 
The introduction to Key's latest book contains the following claim about the 
book's benefits: ''The ideas and information can be used by anyone in a media 
dominated environment to protect themselves against exploitation by picture and 
word symbols" (Key, 1989, p. xvii). This is a typical example of visual-literacy 
advocacy. But the concern for visual literacy has been directed against a rare, 
perhaps largely imaginary, form of manipulation, even though there is no reason to 
assume a general public awareness of the more basic manipulative conventions 
(and, as noted above, some weak grounds for assuming the contrary). In other 
words, without any evidence (or even contrary to the evidence), the attainment of 
visual literacy has been cast as a confrontation with a highly devious-but almost 
nonexistent-antagonist, instead of a more simple-but ubiquitous-one. This seeming 
paradox will be encountered again when this discussion addresses issues of visual 
fabrication and misinformation. This paradox is also present, to a certain extent, in 
the more academically oriented advertising literature.  
With a few exceptions (for example, Ewen, 1988, pp. 48, 51), scholarly 
analyses of advertising have not been concerned with subliminal imagery in the 
sense described above. Instead, they have tended to scrutinize the overt contents of 
images in search of implicit meanings (as opposed to embedded objects). For 
instance, such analyses may treat the elongated shapes of cigarettes, bottles, or 
other objects as phallic symbols (see Wernick, 1991, pp. 41, 60-61, 76-77). The 
psychoanalytic approach informing much of this literature is illustrated explicitly 
in Haineault and Roy's (1993) analysis of a print ad for Rolex Cellini watches. 
Noting the juxtaposition of a watch with a statue (attributed implicitly to 
Benvenuto Cellini), the authors observe: "The representation 'watch' refers to the 
measurement of time, to limitation, and to noneternity, in other words, to the 
mortality, corporeality, and narcissistic castration of the subject" (Haineault and 
Roy, 1993, p. 48). The statue, on the other hand, represents the timeless perfection 
of art. But (their analysis goes on to say) it can also be seen as the effigy on a 
tomb, while the gold watch can itself be seen as a work of art, and thus, through a 
combination of displacement and denial, negative can be transformed into positive. 
Thus, what could be taken as a straightforward attempt to associate a product with 
the desirable qualities of a work of art (a standard practice in the advertising of 
luxury items) is treated, in this analysis, as a complex ensemble of repressed 
meanings and redirected drives.  
Similar complexity is often attributed to advertising imagery by critics 
concerned more directly with ideological matters. In analyzing an ad for Gucci No. 
3 perfume, Stuart Ewen cites Bakhtin for the notion that formal classicism in 
works of art serves to "naturalize" hierarchical social orders by reinforcing such 
values as permanence, order, and exclusivity. Ewen applies this notion to the 
perfume ad, in whose "cool, porcelain tone" he sees "a depiction of beauty that has 
served the interests of exclusive power for centuries" (Ewen, 1988, p. 86). In other 
words, according to this analysis, the seductive formal qualities of this image have 
the effect of inveigling viewers into an acceptance of metaphorically equivalent 
formal qualities-stability, hierarchy-in the social world. 
Referring specifically to the work of Judith Williamson (1978) and Michael 
Geis (1982), Cook has argued that ideological critics of advertising tend to devalue 
the critical abilities of ordinary viewers, who are seen as "vulnerable and easily 
deceived" (1992, p. 205). But what seems more remarkable is these critics' high 
estimation of advertising practitioners' psychological perspicacity and tactical 
elusiveness. It is interesting to compare this conception of the advertising industry 
with what practitioners themselves say in describing what they do (Antin, 1993; 
Ind, 1993; Wolf, 1988). Although references to motivational research and the 
collective unconscious and patriarchal culture are certainly not absent from this 
literature (see Randazzo, 1993, pp. 35, 90, 172-174), David Ogilvy's (1983, p. 14) 
advice is probably more representative: "It pays to give most products an image of 
quality .... This is particularly true of products whose brand-name is visible to your 
friends, like beer, cigarettes and automobiles." Michael Schudson's discussions 
with advertising professionals suggest that the creation of individual 
advertisements is typically guided by informal, intuitive understandings rather than 
by any existing theories of advertising which, in any case, contain very few 
specific guidelines for "visually oriented strategies" (Schudson, 1984, pp. 84-85). 
As an expression of psychological intuition, Ogilvy's statement-which encapsulates 
the concepts of associational juxtaposition and conspicuous consumption in two 
sentences-is hardly simpleminded. But the process it envisions is not easy to 
reconcile with the indirectness and circuitousness assumed in much scholarly 
writing about advertising. A similar emphasis on devious, hard-to detect forms of 
manipulation is present in recent scholarly and critical writing about visual 
misinformation, discussed next. 
 
VISUAL MISINFORMATION 
The Alteration of Photographic Images 
 
Since the early 1980s, the communication industry's processing of photographs has 
increasingly relied on digital imaging technology, which entails the electronic 
encoding of images for purposes of storage, transmission, or computer assisted 
alteration. The latter process has become particularly controversial as its use has 
spread. It has been calculated that by 1989 ten percent of all color photographs 
published in the United States were altered in some way by computer (Wall Street 
Journal estimate, cited in W. Mitchell, 1992, p. 16). This practice originated as an 
extension of earlier routine procedures (for example, re-touching, color-correction, 
and so forth). but the greater precision and wider variety of the changes enabled by 
new technology have elicited increased levels of scrutiny.  
In addition to surveying the history of digital imaging technology and 
explaining its technical aspects, William Mitchell (1992) provides a useful 
overview of the applications of this technology that can raise questions of 
misinformation and visual falsehood. He groups these potentially problematic 
applications into three general categories: (1) insertions, exemplified by a Newsday 
cover photo in which a single fighter jet's image was pasted repeatedly into a 
scene, giving the impression of an entire formation of jets flying in unison (pp. 
196, 200); (2) effacements and elisions, for example, the deletion of a shoulder 
holster and pistol from a Rolling Stone cover photograph of a TV cop show star (p. 
202); (3) substitutions, such as the grafting of Oprah Winfrey's head onto the body 
of Ann-Margret in a TV Guide cover  image (p. 209). Mitchell also mentions 
another kind of alteration, which might be termed rearrangement, for example, the 
February, 1982, cover of National Geographic, in which two Egyptian pyramids 
were shifted closer together in order to enhance the aesthetic appeal of the 
photograph (p. 16).  
Critical discussion of such practices has dealt extensively with their 
implications for viewers' attitudes about the truth value of photographs. In a widely 
cited account, Fred Ritchin, former director of photography of the New York Time 
Magazine, gives his reaction to a manipulated photograph that appeared in 
Newsweek on January 16, 1989. The photograph showed the two stars of the film 
Rain Man standing next to each other. Some two weeks after the picture's 
publication Ritchin discovered that this image was a composite, put together from 
two individual photographs. Ritchin responds: ''I felt not only misled but 
extraordinarily shaken, as if while intend observing the world it had somehow still 
managed to signify change without my noticing." In reference to photography in 
general, he adds that "now the viewer must question the photograph at the basic 
physical level of fact" (Ritchin, 1990, p. 9; see also Harris, 1991, p. 167). 
The vehemence of this reaction is not unusual. The kind of radical attitudinal 
shift that Ritchin recalls experiencing has been forecast for the general public in 
other writers' analyses (Brand et al., 1985; Grundberg, 1990; Harris, 1991; Martin, 
1991; W. Mitchell, 1992). The shared assumption behind such forecasts is that the 
public has hitherto viewed photographs as direct, unimpeachable records of reality; 
and that growing public awareness of digital imaging practices will eventually lead 
to a collapse of faith in the entire medium. Intense concern about how to avoid this 
outcome has been expressed both by academic observers (for example, Bossen, 
1985) and by journalists directly involved with the computer manipulation of 
images (see Lasica, 1989). 
The first thing to be said about these expressions of concern, especially 
when they come from the world of academic scholarship, is that there is a certain 
element of self-contradiction in them. In academic writing on photography, the 
broad public's supposed faith in the medium has commonly been viewed as "naïve 
realism,'' and considerable effort has gone into undermining its foundations. In 
fact, a persistent and broad-based attack on photography's documentary status has 
traditionally been a central theme of photographic criticism (For example, Curtis, 
1989; Freund, 1980; Snyder, 1980)-as Ritchin himself acknowledges elsewhere in 
his book (Ritchin, 1990, pp. 81ft). Under these circumstances, one might have 
expected that predictions of a widespread loss of faith in photography would be 
greeted with approval, as evidence that "photographic literacy" was finally about to 
spread to the many from the few.  
This point leads to a related observation. One of the many underpinnings of 
the "anti-realist" tradition in photographic scholarship has been the fact that 
photographs could always be altered, often in ways that were as convincing as the 
results of today's computer-based techniques. Earlier methods of alteration have 
been described in some detail by Jaubert (1989, pp. 9-14), in the introduction to a 
major study of the use of these methods by totalitarian regimes. Among the various 
forms of alteration discussed in this study, perhaps the most striking is the visual 
obliteration of political figures who had fallen from favor or lost leadership 
struggles--for instance, the elimination of Leon Trotsky from a 1920 photograph of 
Lenin, following Trotsky's exile and murder under Stalin; the removal of Liu 
Shaoqi from a photograph of Mao, after Liu had been tortured and killed during the 
Cultural Revolution; and the effacement, from a picture of Fidel Castro, of a 
former associate who went into exile following Castro's support of the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia (Jaubert, 1989, pp. 30-31, 116, 160, respectively). 
It is instructive to compare these examples with the kinds of alterations 
addressed in criticism of digital imaging. Most of this criticism has dealt with the 
cases mentioned earlier, in connection with Mitchell's category system, and with 
such other examples as the removal of a Diet Coke can from the picture of a 
Pulitzer Prize winner celebrating his award (see Christians et al., 1991, pp. 61-64). 
Even though this incident and the ones cited by Mitchell may seem relatively 
insignificant-at least in contrast to those described by Jaubert-the effacement of the 
Coke can was "hotly debated" by the staff of the newspaper in which the picture 
was published. The paper's policy for news photographs now prohibits any 
computer manipulation for purposes of "moving, eliminating, or adding elements" 
(Christians et al., 1991, pp. 61, 64). Formally or informally, similar approaches 
have been adopted at other major publications, although editors have typically 
reserved the right to make more substantial changes in photographs used outside of 
news or documentary contexts (Reaves, 1991). 
The attention received by the Coke can erasure and other arguably minor 
episodes could be seen as evidence of the extreme scrupulousness informing the 
news media's processing of images. From another perspective, however, this 
evidence becomes more questionable, and any confidence it might inspire appear 
somewhat spurious. As Christians et al. make clear in their presentation of the 
Coke can picture before and after its alteration (1991, p. 62), the removal could 
have been achieved by cropping. The can could also have been omitted if the initial 
photograph had been taken from a slightly different angle in the first place. Unlike 
cropping or other means of post-facto alteration, this aspect of photographic 
"manipulation" – selectivity in angle of representation or in choice among images - 
is an inevitable element in any act of picture taking; and, in contrast to these other 
practices, it is an act that would be much more difficult to regulate through hard-
and-fast rules. 
From these considerations emerge two questions that visual-literacy 
scholarship has not yet addressed adequately and that therefore suggest directions 
for future research: To what extent has the occasional publicity surrounding image 
alteration (perhaps most notably the case of the TV Guide Oprah Winfrey cover) 
actually led to a broader awareness about techniques of photographic 
manipulation? Conversely, to what extent have editors' public commitments to 
avoid computer alteration of news photographs resulted in a (possibly 
unwarranted) increase in viewers' confidence regarding the veracity of mass-
mediated visual information? 
 
The Staging of Photographic Images 
 
Critical examination of the alteration of photographs is often accompanied by 
concern over another form of potential misinformation, the presentation of staged 
images as if they were authentic. Fred Ritchin's discussion of the composite 
Newsweek photo also mentions one of the most controversial instances of staging, 
an ABC news program's unlabeled "re-enactment" of an alleged spying incident 
involving the transfer of a briefcase from a U.S. citizen to a Soviet agent (Ritchin, 
1990, p. 26). This episode drew criticism not only for the unacknowledged staging 
but also because the staged scene turned out to contain inaccuracies (for example, 
the actual incident occurred in a different location from the one shown in the '"re-
enactment"; see Schorr, 1989, p. 47). The staging of "news" was also the focus of 
considerable attention in a more recent case, a "Dateline NBC" broadcast whose 
images of a G.M. truck catching fire in a collision had been created by rigging the 
truck with hidden explosives (Carter, 1993). General Motors responded by 
withdrawing its advertising from all NBC News programs, but the ensuing 
publicity is said to have increased "Dateline NBC's" ratings (Zurawik and Stoehr, 
1993, p. 30). It was subsequently revealed that similar tampering with vehicles has 
occurred repeatedly in other TV news stories on car and truck safety (Olson, 1993). 
Beyond its use in "news" contexts, staging has come to be seen as 
problematic because of the increasing variety of television formats for which 
traditional labels of "reality" or "fiction" no longer seem applicable: "Today, 
distinctions between TV news, info-tainment programs, docu-dramas,  historically 
based' miniseries. or other forms of fictional television entertainment may be less 
clear than we have assumed" (Griffin, 1992, p. 124). Furthermore, there is a 
lengthy record of unacknowledged or boundary-blurring staging in political 
advertising (Jamieson, 1992, pp. 147ft). This history includes: the Hollywood 
industry's use of faked film of left-wing immigrants in an attempt to discredit 
socialist Upton Sinclair's campaign for governor of California (G. Mitchell, 1992); 
the staging of enthusiastic studio-audience responses in the TV shows that formed 
a large part of Richard Nixon's 1968 presidential campaign (McGinnis, 1969); and 
the intercutting of staged and documentary images in Ronald Reagan's 1984 
campaign advertising (Morreale, 1991). Finally, visual fabrication of a different 
sort has been an issue in the case of pictures produced for scholarly purposes, and 
there is a sizable literature on the staging of ethnographic and other "documentary" 
images (Jacknis, 1984; Lyman, 1982; Scherer, 1975). 
Whereas the computerized alteration of images is commonly assumed to be 
virtually undetectable (so long as it conforms to criteria of plausibility), viewers' 
awareness of the presence of unacknowledged staging is a more open issue. 
Cialdini (1993) has argued that simulating natural behavior is not always easy and 
that certain kinds of staging should therefore be obvious to the viewer. He cites in 
particular the use of supposedly unrehearsed-but, in his view, "blatantly phony"-
testimonials in TV commercials.All the same, the more typical assumption in 
critical commentary is that simulations do deceive viewers (Linn, 1991; Saltzman, 
1989; Slattery and Tiedge, 1992), and there is no shortage of supportive anecdotes, 
such as the case of an actor who was mistakenly turned in to the authorities after 
portraying a fugitive in a TV "re-enactment" (Zoglin, 1989, p. 98). 
As these examples suggest, it seems reasonable to suppose that awareness of 
staging may depend in part on the context. This possibility seems an appropriate 
candidate for future research on visual literacy. That viewers tend to be more alert 
to the possibility of deception in advertising than in other contexts is perfectly 
conceivable. Moreover, since some forms of "reality-based" programming are 
relatively recent developments, it may be that viewers have not yet formed stable 
interpretive frameworks for dealing with such material. As Gross (1985) has 
pointed out, experienced viewers may operate on the basis of a complex set of 
distinctions regarding the degree and kind of staging (or other manipulation) 
present in any particular genre. 
What happens when viewers do become aware of staging? To a certain 
extent, scholarly and journalistic commentary on this point has paralleled the 
criticism of alteration reviewed above. In particular, it has been predicted that the 
increasingly frequent presence of "reenactments" and other kinds of staged 
material in the news may lead to a general erosion of the public's faith in news 
images (Saltzman, 1989). Slattery & Tiedge (1992) asked viewers to judge the 
credibility of staged news segments with or without labels acknowledging the 
staging. The use of such labels was not found to have any consequences for 
viewers' judgments about individual news segments (which were presumably taken 
as authentic when the labels were absent). However, ratings of credibility did go 
down when viewers were shown a program in which more than one story was 
labelled as having been staged. 
As in the case of alteration, one's attitude toward such a finding, and toward 
the more general prediction that it supports, will presumably depend on one's 
beliefs about the appropriate degree of faith that the news deserves in the first 
place. The strong position that some broadcasters have taken against staging in the 
news mirrors the position of newspapers toward alteration, and may be questioned 
on similar grounds. As Lee and Solomon put it, referring to the "brouhaha over TV 
news 'simulations' '': "Widespread condemnation of this practice has been ironic, 
given that so much of the news blurs fact and fiction on a routine basis. When 
programs like CBS' Saturday Night with Connie Chung air contrived footage of 
supposedly real events, they are re-enacting what happens regularly--albeit more 
subtly--on network news broadcasts" (1990, p. 336). Similarly, Weiss (1989, p. 42) 
has charged that "for all their fulminating against the tabloids, mainstream 
newscasters haven't set a noble standard." 
These comments may be interpreted at two levels. Most obviously, they 
point to the existence of forms of fabrication that may be less clearly manipulative 
than simulations--but are likely to be more pervasive. For one thing, much of what 
appears in the news has been shaped by the participants themselves to fit the 
expectations of news organizations (cf. Day, 1991, p. 85). Perhaps more 
significantly, though, even the most "authentic" material is always and necessarily 
subject to one form of unavoidable authorial intrusion, namely, selection (in terms 
of framing, angle of view, choice among competing perspectives, and so forth). 
The issue of selection will be examined further in the next section of this 
discussion. For the moment, it should be added that Weiss's and Lee and 
Solomon's comments about these matters also imply that an over-emphasis on the 
consequences of staging may have the effect of diverting attention away from the 
latter practices. 
In a broader sense, however, these writers' comments may be read as a 
challenge to the very distinction between authentic and staged behavior. Lee & 
Solomon's point about the blurring of fact and fiction echoes a related view, 
namely, that both "reality-based'' and overtly "fictional" material may be structured 
according to similar formal principles or ideological premises. This view has been 
a common feature in criticism of the more traditional forms of reality-based 
material--for example, documentaries (Linton, 1992) and ethnographic films 
(Hansen et al., 1991)-and it is not surprising to encounter it in examinations of 
current practices (Campbell and Freed, 1993; Cavender and Bond-Maupin, 1995; 
Kozloff, 1992). Nevertheless, from the perspective of this discussion what counts 
is whether labels such as ''documentary" or "fiction" still matter to viewers. 
Research on this point will be reviewed below in an examination of openly 
fictional film and television. 
 
The Selectivity of Photographic Representation 
 
As has already been noted, the one form of visual control that no reality-based 
presentation can avoid is the selection of what to show. In fact, this is essentially a 
tautological observation, and to a certain extent the issue of visual selection may be 
too obvious to need much discussion. Still, a brief look at some examples of the 
considerable consequences of selectivity may be useful. It is also worth noting that 
what is obviously in principle is not always obvious to viewers in practice. 
Given its inevitability, the selectivity of the news camera was the principal 
focus of an early, paradigmatic study of potential misinformation in TV news 
(Lang and Lang, 1952). The study dealt with television's presentation of an event 
related to the Korean War: General Douglas MacArthur's visit to Chicago after he 
was abruptly dismissed from his command by President Truman. A systematic 
comparison between the televised images of MacArthur's reception and the reports 
of trained on-site observers showed that television had selectively emphasized 
images of enthusiasm on the part of the public, giving an impression of strong 
support for MacArthur that did not correspond to the direct, on-site reports. This 
study illustrates that deciding what constitutes misleading selectivity is not always 
a simple matter. In contrast to the cases of alteration and staging, here there can be 
no absolute standard of non-intervention. All the same, the pattern observed in the 
study had definite implications: Since the confrontation between MacArthur and 
Truman was part of a broader political conflict regarding the conduct of the war, 
television's role in this incident cannot be dismissed as simply an attempt to keep 
viewers interested (even if that was the actual motivation for the way the event was 
covered). 
A characteristic contemporary example of the potential consequences of 
visual selectivity has been given by Larry Gross (1988). Gross' analysis of news 
images of lesbian and gay marches and political gatherings suggests that television 
coverage of such events has tended to feature those participants whose appearance 
is most likely to draw a negative reaction from hostile viewers. A similar point has 
been made by Parenti, referring to news photographs of antiwar protests: 
"Individual demonstrators who convey a kooky appearance will more likely catch 
the camera's eye than those of more conventional deportment, the purpose of such 
photographs being not only to highlight the unusual but to delegitimate the 
protesters, making them the issue rather than the thing they are protesting" (1986, 
p. 224). 
Under the heading of selectivity, it may also be appropriate to consider 
briefly one aspect of the imagery appearing in news reports of the Persian Gulf 
War. A prominent feature of these reports was the repeated display of pictures of 
"smart bombs" being guided precisely onto their targets. The pictures may have 
"created an illusion of remote, bloodless, pushbutton battle in which only military 
targets were assumed destroyed" (Walker, 1992, p. 84). However, subsequent 
reports indicate that, "of all bombs dropped on Iraq, only seven percent were so-
called smart bombs, and of these at most 70 percent were thought to have hit their 
intended targets" (Lee and Solomon, 1990, p. xx). Furthermore, it appears that Iraq 
experienced substantial civilian casualties, especially in Basra (Walker, 1992, pp. 
87-88; see also Sifry and Cerf, 1991, p. 336n). In short, the selectiveness of the 
smart-bomb images may have misled viewers about one of the war's most serious 
consequences. (Whether public knowledge about this discrepancy would have 
made much difference at the time is another matter; see Jowett, 1993.) 
In all of these examples, then, the potential implications are substantial, but 
the source of those implications is conceptually simple: pointing the camera in one 
direction instead of another, picking one video clip out of a number of alternatives. 
In principle, therefore, alertness to the possibility of this kind of visual 
misinformation should also be a relatively straightforward matter. This does not 
mean that viewers should necessarily be expected to display greater alertness in 
this area than in any of the others we have examined so far. What it does mean, 
however, is that lack of alertness in this area cannot be attributed to the complexity 
of the means of manipulation. 
 
THE ILLUSION OF REALITY IN VISUAL FICTION 
 
Analyses of the ideological implications of fictional TV programs and films 
usually deal with thematic content and plot structure rather than with visual 
composition or editing. However, in one area of ideological analysis, visual 
variables have played a central role. This area is directly concerned with viewers' 
awareness of manipulation; it deals with the visual devices through which viewers 
are encouraged to overlook the ficticity of films and TV programs and to succumb 
to an illusion of reality. Much recent writing in this area reflects the influence of 
work done in cinema studies in the 1970s. The theoretical formulations that came 
out of that work have been modified, extended, or attacked in various ways over 
the years, but they still figure centrally in current scholarship, if only as a 
counterpoint to subsequent developments. The discussion that follows will take 
these original formulations as starting points and refer to more recent arguments 
where appropriate. It can be said at the outset, though, that while these latter 
arguments have tended to question the potency of the ideological effects posited by 
the earlier theorists, they have been less likely to challenge the intricacy of those 
theorists’ models of the ideological process. 
A common-sense assumption about cinematic realism is that it encourages 
viewers to accept the messages that movies may contain. This assumption is at the 
core of a more expansive conception of realism and ideology developed by such 
writers as Baudry (1975), Heath (1981), Metz (1982), Oudart (1978), and 
Silverman (1983), among others. In the hands of these writers, the core assumption 
was extended through a variety of elaborations, whose thrust may be summarized 
as follows: Mainstream Hollywood cinema is characterized by certain stylistic 
features that serve to suppress the viewer's awareness of ficticity and artifice; this 
suppression of awareness occurs in parallel with a lapse into a regressive 
psychological state, in which the viewer identifies with the screen image, 
experiencing it as her/his own creation; by virtue of experiencing the movie as if 
she/he were its author, the viewer comes to accept the ideological premises that 
shaped the movie as if they were her/his own. 
What should one make of these assumptions? To begin with, it is certainly 
true that in certain respects mainstream movies are typically designed to look 
"realistic." Most obviously, perhaps, this has to do with such matters as costuming 
and set design -- he surface appearance of a film or TV program. Hollywood lore 
contains any number of stories about the lengths to which filmmakers have gone in 
pursuit of realism in this sense. For example, one of Alfred Hitchcock’s former 
assistants recalls being sent out to study ''exactly" how car salesmen were dressed 
in a certain part of the country, so that Hitchcock could replicate that look in 
Psycho (Rebello, 1990, p. 56; see also Truffaut, 1967, p. 192). 
Mainstream cinema can also be considered realistic in another sense. As 
filmmakers themselves often acknowledge most fictional genres (in both film and 
television) have traditionally tended to avoid the use of stylistic devices that might 
draw attention to style at the expense of content. This point was expressed by 
Ralph Rosenblum, a prominent editor: "Regardless of its extent or style, editing 
should not impress or call attention to itself. As an audience, we no more want to 
see the wheels and gears and levers responsible for the effect the film is having on 
us than we want to set the pencil marks on an author's tint draft or the invisible 
wires in a magic show" (Rosenblum and Karen, 1979, p. 296). Once again, the case 
of Psycho provides a useful illustration: In a murder scene that takes place on a 
staircase. Hitchcock wanted to use an overhead camera angle (pointing straight 
down) to conceal the face of the killer. But he was concerned that a direct cut to 
such a relatively unusual angle would be obtrusive. His solution was to have the 
camera rise in tandem with a character walking up the stairs, thus ''naturalizing" the 
eventual high angle (Truffaut. 1967, p. 208). In other words, the more general aim 
in this kind of situation is to give the impression that camerawork and editing are 
simply flowing from the actions and thoughts of characters inside the narrative, 
instead of being controlled by external intentions. 
It is this aspect of cinematic realism that is, the "suppression" of evidence of 
artifice-that became the principal focus of the theoretical framework outlined 
above. However, rather than seeing this suppression as a matter of merely 
occasional significance, tied to instances in which the likelihood that a film might 
give itself away is particularly high (as in Psycho), this theoretical framework has 
treated the process of suppressing awareness as a central component of movies' 
effects on viewers. To put it differently, it has been assumed that threats to the 
illusion of reality are regular features of cinematic structure, not isolated cases. A 
detailed attempt to derive this assumption from an analysis of Hollywood editing 
conventions is contained in an influential article by Oudart (1978) and a related 
piece by Dayan (1974). Oudart's argument deals with the shot/reverse-shot 
principle of shooting and editing, according to which an off-screen look by a 
character in one shot is followed by a matching look from a character in the next 
shot, so that the viewer gets a sense of a continuous interaction. This is probably 
the most common form of editing in most fictional genres. According to Oudart, a 
single off-screen look, without the matching look from the next shot, would 
threaten the illusion of reality. It would alert the viewer to the space outside the 
movie frame--a space that contains the movie projector, as well as the viewer 
her/himself. But the viewer's awareness of this space is averted when the off-screen 
look is provided with a target inside the world of the movie, namely, the character 
in the matching, reverse-angle shot. 
Discussions of this argument have sometimes treated it as an autonomous set 
of statements about the viewing experience (see Rothman, 1975), but in Oudart's 
work it was intimately connected to the psychoanalytic assumptions that have 
constituted another major component of this line of scholarship. The essential 
element in these assumptions is the idea that the process of movie viewing is 
analogous to-and, indeed, recapitulates-the infantile experience of gaining a sense 
of self-mastery through identification with another person (or with a mirror image 
of the infant's own body). According to this idea, the disruption produced by the 
off-screen look is analogous to the infant's experience of lack when it becomes 
aware of an external, superior source of order. The matching shot's effect in 
countering the off-screen look recapitulates the infant's internalization of the 
dictates of the social order. 
Clearly this conceptual model does not leave much room for critical or even 
reflective viewership. In the words of another of the principal architects of this 
model, when viewers are watching a movie, "whether they know it or not (but they 
do not), [they] find themselves chained, captured, or captivated" (Baudry, 1975, p. 
309). The inflexibility of this view was a major point of disagreement as the media 
scholarship of the 1980s moved towards a conception of active, resisting viewers 
(Gaines, 1992). By and large, subsequent scholarship has also discarded the 
"dizzying array of analogies" through which the model sought to make its 
psychoanalytic claims (Mayne, 1993, p. 46). The most sustained refutation of those 
claims comes from Carroll (1988); several writers have turned to cognitive 
psychology, and to an image of active sense-making, as alternatives to the 
psychoanalytic conception of the viewing process (for example, Anderson, 1993; 
Bordwell, 1985; Branigan, 1992). 
In fact, however, psychoanalytic analogies are not an essential element of 
theories about the ideological implications of cinematic realism. The core 
assumption of these theories-i.e., the notion that a naturalistic visual style makes a 
movie's ideological premises also seem natural--can stand on its own, without any 
psychoanalytic underpinnings. This more basic view of stylistic naturalism is 
expressed succinctly by Roben Ray: ''The ideological power of Classic 
Hollywood's procedure is obvious: under its sponsorship, even the most 
manufactured narratives came to seem spontaneous and 'real' '' (Ray, 1985, p. 55). 
This kind of view of the relationship between style and ideology has enjoyed much 
greater staying power than the earlier psychoanalytic formulations. A current 
version is set forth systematically by Bruce Kawin (1992), in a popular textbook on 
film theory. Kawin argues that the compositional and editing devices developed by 
the movie industry are nothing but arbitrary conventions; that moviemakers have 
nevertheless succeeded in conditioning viewers to overlook this arbitrariness and 
to respond to movies as if they were natural events; and that this concealment of 
stylistic authorship serves to conceal the arbitrariness of movies' ideological 
content (Kawin, 1992, p. 50ff). 
Kawin's argument could be strengthened by the observation that the stylistic 
codes of mainstream fiction films and TV programs are not entirely arbitrary and 
are often modelled on principles of real-world visual perception (Messaris, 1994). 
Even in its present form, however, the argument is not very different from what 
could probably be considered the "common-sense" view of these matters--namely, 
that stylistic realism makes viewers more susceptible to a movie's effects. Perhaps 
because of its commonsensical quality, this view is rarely challenged directly (see 
Carroll, 1988). Nevertheless, it should not be taken entirely for granted.  
Some evidence that could be seen as supporting this view comes from a 
recent study by Mares (1994). Mares showed viewers movie excerpts and news 
clips about similar subjects and then asked them to recall which incidents had 
occurred in which of the two formats. Viewers who mistakenly remembered the 
fictional material as if it had occurred in the news were more likely to have high 
scores on a "cultivation index" (derived from Gerbner and Gross's Cultural 
Indicators project), indicative of agreement with television's perspective on reality 
(presumed to be relatively monolithic). If these viewers' post-facto confusion 
between movies and news can be taken as evidence of an analogous confusion 
between fiction and reality while they were actually watching this material, the 
results of this study can be read as confirming the common-sense view about the 
ideological consequences of the illusion of reality. On the other hand, however, it 
is entirely conceivable that the viewers' misattributions resulted only from faulty 
memory, not earlier confusion. Furthermore, it is possible that the best way to 
interpret these results is to reverse the direction of causality: People whose views 
coincide with television's perspectives on reality may be more likely to attribute 
those perspectives to the news than to fiction. 
A different way of testing the commonsense view of illusionism is to 
examine one of its corollaries, namely, the idea that a representational style which 
violates the illusion of reality should lead to greater awareness of ideology. This 
idea’s emergence in film scholarship was partly an extension of analogous notions 
about the theater, particularly the work of Berrolt Brecht (Eisaesser, 1990). In film 
scholarship, the idea has led to an interest in movies that deliberately call attention 
to their artificiality by breaking standard conventions and/or by openly showing or 
referring to the movie-making process (see Hedges, 1991; Stam, 1992). Messaris 
(1981) studied viewers' reactions to such devices using a film that included scenes 
about its own production and that violated several editing conventions. Despite 
these "anti-illusionistic" devices, the general tendency in the viewers' responses 
was to treat the film in terms of story progression and character motivation, rather 
than authorial intent. 
Doubts about any necessary connection between stylistic anti-illusionism 
and ideological awareness have also been raised in studies of two fictional genres 
that routinely deviate from some of the conventions of illusionistic narration. In 
particular, Jane Feuer (1982) has observed that Hollywood musicals often employ 
a variety of "self-reflexive" devices (references to show business, to other 
musicals, to the audience, etc.) without any concomitant departure from a 
"conservative" social orientation. Mimi White (1992) has argued that self-
referentiality in TV situation comedies (for example, Bob Newhart dreaming in 
one show of a character he had played on another show) serves to strengthen the 
affective and intellectual appeal of television fiction, rather than subverting its 
message. 
More generally, then, it seems appropriate to take a skeptical stance towards 
the conventional equation between stylistic unobtrusiveness and ideological 
efficacy. However, even if one were to accept this equation uncritically, one might 
still want to question the centrality it has been accorded in discussions of viewers' 
confrontations with the screen. As noted earlier, it is only at relatively rare 
moments (for example, in movies like Psycho) that the concealment of artistic 
devices becomes an active ingredient of mainstream film style. It may be true that 
ordinary viewers do not ordinarily attend to the structural characteristics of 
camerawork, editing, etc., but tacitness of message structure is not the same thing 
as deliberate concealment. Moreover, if it is the apparent realism of movies that is 
at issue in this line of cinema scholarship, one could also ask why more attention 
has not been paid to viewers' attitudes toward the physical world on the screen. The 
achievement of realism in this area is a common, sometimes major, preoccupation 
in both film and TV production (as in the example from Psycho mentioned above). 
Yet scholarly interest in these matters has usually been slight. 
In effect, what has happened here is that the attainment of "literate" viewing 
has been envisioned as a contest against a hidden foe--even though that foe's active 
attempts at self-concealment are arguably rare, and despite the presence of a more 
common alternative antagonist. This way of formulating the viewers' task is similar 
to conceptions encountered earlier in this article, in connection with advertising 
and with informational uses of images. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This article has reviewed theoretical accounts of what viewers are up against in 
their confrontations with manipulative or misleading images. The review began by 
summarizing empirical findings on viewers' awareness of camera angle, subjective 
camera, and associational juxtaposition. All three are frequently found in visual 
advertising (in fact, the third is probably the most common tool of visual 
persuasion). All three have been found to affect viewers' responses to persuasive 
images. All three appear to operate outside of the conscious awareness of many 
viewers—even though all of these devices are based on relatively simple 
conceptual principles. Nonetheless, much theoretical and critical discussion of 
visual advertising has painted a picture of manipulative devices that are highly 
complex or elaborately devious--even though some of these devices may be 
entirely absent from mass-media advertising. 
The second area examined in this review had to do with potentially 
misleading images in the news media. Recent academic and journalistic criticism 
in this area has dealt extensively with the alteration of photographs by means of 
digital imaging technology, and with the use of staging or simulation in TV news. 
Critics of these practices commonly predict that their widespread use may lead to 
an erosion of public faith in photographic media. However, a third source of 
potential visual misinformation--namely, the simple fact that all images are 
selective--is already an inevitable, but less discussed, feature of any informational 
use of photographic media. 
The article's final section was an overview of theoretical arguments about 
the relationship in fictional narratives between visual style and ideology. The 
traditional notion about this relationship is that mainstream movies tend to conceal 
their artificiality from the viewer, and that this concealment fosters an impression 
of reality which serves to "naturalize" these movies' ideological premises. In 
addition to questioning the connections envisioned in this notion, this review 
suggested that the concealment of artifice may not play as central a role in 
mainstream movie style as commonly assumed. There may be other, more 
pervasive sources for viewers' impression of reality. 
One of the points of this review has been that much of the scholarly and 
journalistic literature has tended to focus on relatively complex and elusive forms 
of visual manipulation, while paying less attention to simpler, less-devious--but 
also, arguably, much more common--practices. It may be appropriate to end with 
some speculations about possible consequences of this pattern for viewers, for 
media practitioners, and for the critics and scholars from whose writings the 
pattern has emerged.  
It could be argued that the critics' emphasis on the more devious forms of 
visual manipulation or deception may have contributed to a highlighting of public 
skepticism towards the visual media--a consequence that may be welcomed or 
deplored, depending on one's own perspective. On the other hand, this critical 
tendency may also be seen in a rather different light. From the point of view of the 
producers of mass-media images, the critics' emphasis on the arcane and the 
recondite may not be entirely unwelcome, if it deflects attention away from certain 
more commonplace practices. For example, advertisers themselves will 
occasionally bring up the subject of subliminal advertising, since they can 
truthfully deny using such techniques (see Ogilvy, 1983, p. 209). More 
significantly, news organizations' vehement stands against computer alterations of 
images may convey an air of objectivity that might be less easy to justify if the 
critical focus were to shift to other news practices (cf. Lee and Solomon, 1990, p. 
336). 
It may also be pertinent to point out that the critical emphases summarized 
above have coincided, in recent years, with a tendency among media scholars to 
conceptualize audiences as active and resisting. Some research conducted in this 
spirit has drawn attention to audience behavior in which the element of resistance 
is indeed clear (for example, readers who sent copies of sexist ads to Ms. 
magazine's ''No Comment" section; see Steiner, 1988). It seems fair to say, 
however, that in other cases the construction of the resisting viewer owes much to 
the researcher's own predispositions. Judith Mayne observes a strong tendency 
toward constituting a viewer who is always resisting, always struggling, always 
seemingly just on the verge of becoming the embodiment of the researcher's own 
political ideal" (Mayne, 1993, p. 61). In other words, viewers often fail to attain the 
researcher's own ideal, despite having been conceptualized as active. 
This aspect of current media scholarship seems particularly relevant to the 
conceptions of visual literacy examined in this review. More specifically, the 
emphasis on the more baroque forms of visual manipulation can be seen as a way 
of rationalizing the failure of supposedly resisting viewers to attain the insights of 
the researcher. Conceptualizing visual literacy as an almost impossible challenge 
may serve to uphold the supposition that viewers would share the researcher’s 
perspective if only they could. 
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